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Abstract Many of the fundamental concepts of biology
lack consensual, precise definitions. Partly, this is due to a
contrast between our discrete language and the continuous
character of nature. Some debates over these concepts are
confounded by the use of the same terms with different
specific meanings, indicating a possible need for an
expanded scientific lexicon. Words have their own histo-
ries, and frequently scientific terms with a vernacular origin
retain associated vestigial meanings. Even terms newly
coined within science have histories and changing mean-
ings, which can lead to confusion among debaters. Debates
over concepts are further confounded when the same terms
are used in different fields of biology, with distinct (even
conflicting) objectives, and by biologists with different
approaches and perspectives. I illustrate these issues by
considering the debate over the concept of species and the
unit of selection.
Keywords Definition  Language  Species concept 
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Concepts and terms as historic entities
Visual graphics (such as phylogenetic trees or distribution
maps) and formal mathematics are used for conveying and
clarifying scientific ideas, but verbal language is an
essential medium in describing and discussing nature.
Given the continuous character of natural processes and the
discrete nature of our verbal language, we are immediately
faced with a difficulty. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the definition and usage of words is often the object of
intense debate. For instance, within biology, several arti-
cles and books have been dedicated to discussing the
concept of species (Coyne and Orr 2004; Hey 2001; Mallet
1995; Wu 2001 and accompanying commentaries). This is
only one among several terms within evolutionary biology
with some degree of associated ambiguity, whose precise
definition is object of discussion, and whose definition
varies among authors and context. Indeed, this is the case
for many of the central terms of biology, for instance,
population, fitness, adaptation, niche, gene, and life itself.
Fortunately, these debates do not entirely hinder research:
the scientific community continues to use them despite a
certain degree of ambiguity. Rather, discussion—among
scientists and philosophers of science—concerning the
meaning of these terms can lead to further clarification of
the entities and processes.
Some of these terms were originally part of the ver-
nacular lexicon, prior to their use within a scientific context
where a greater precision is required or demanded. This is
certainly the case with the term life. In common parlance
and upon consideration of quotidian cases, little doubts
arise as to whether a specific entity is a living or non-living
object. Yet if one is pressed to formulate a precise defini-
tion of life it is no easy task. Properties such as metabolism,
growth, reaction to stimuli, and reproduction are frequently
invoked as properties of life. But one can evoke cases that
question the universality of these defining characteristics.
Take the case of dormant seeds. These have the potential
for metabolism, growth and eventually reproduction, but as
such dormant seeds do none of these things. It is the rec-
ognition that they are a stage of a larger life cycle that leads
one to consider them as living.
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A precise definition of life is no easier for biologists,
familiar with a broader spectrum of entities, particularly
those that boarder and defy common definitions. As our
knowledge of the diversity of the natural world increases,
so does the challenge in finding an overarching definition.
Take, for instance, the case of viruses. These entities are
composed of a protein capsid that encloses a strand of
nucleic acid. They are incapable of reproducing by them-
selves, independently of their host’s biochemical machin-
ery, and do not grow in size or metabolize. They are
therefore at the fringe of what one might consider living,
particularly when compared to certain chemical processes,
such as crystallization. A phenomenon similar to repro-
duction occurs when adding a sodium chlorate crystal to a
supersaturated solution of this compound: new crystals are
formed, not unlike reproduction. Furthermore, if one stirs
this solution vigorously, new crystals preserve the chirality
of the original crystal: a phenomenon analogous to heredity
(Plaxco and Gross 2006). Yet, virus require proteins to
reproduce—proteins composed of the same 20 L-a-amino
acids common to all known members of the Tree of Life—
and nucleic acids are the basis of their heredity. Their
genes can suffer mutation, generating variation, and they
are thus able to evolve by natural selection and adapt.
Consider some additional fringe examples. (1) Some
free RNAs are capable of auto-catalyzing their replication
without additional structures, merely requiring a sufficient
source of nucleic acids in their medium. They function
both as hereditary units and enzymes, and raise interesting
possibilities regarding the evolution of pre-cellular life. (2)
Prions are mis-folded variants of regularly folded proteins,
which perform a necessary function within their host.
When prions come into contact with normal proteins, given
the presence of host polysaccharides, they are able to
transform these into new prions, i.e., reproduce. The
propagation of prions within a host leads to diseases such
as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or ‘‘mad cow
disease’’) in cattle and Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease in
humans. Wickner et al. (2009) have recently shown that
prions are capable of crossing host species, yet when the
evolutionary distance between hosts is too wide, they can
mutate and evolve producing new prion variants. Prions,
however, have no nucleic acids, a characteristic common to
all unambiguously recognized forms of life on earth. (3)
Computer programmers use systems to evolve computer
code, using the processes of mutation, recombination,
reproduction and selection, i.e., a virtual process analogous
to biological evolution by natural selection. All these
phenomena pose a challenge when attempting to formulate
a definition of life that is both precise and maintains some
correspondence with the traditional conception of the term.
These examples not only illustrate some difficulties in
defining life, but also illustrate how new challenges to our
scientific definition of terms increases as our knowledge of
the natural (and artificial) world expands. In the case of the
term life, scientists are also confronted with issues that
arise when they incorporate vernacular terms into their
scientific vocabulary. Despite efforts to use more precise
definitions within the scientific context, inevitably these
terms, even among scientists, continue to be connoted with
their prior, vernacular definitions, i.e., using an evolution-
ary analogy, they retain vestigial meaning. Charles Darwin
considered the pitfalls of using existing terms, for instance,
when he considered the use of the less connoted term
contrivance rather than the term adaptation, one used by
William Paley and others in using adaptations and com-
plexity as demonstrations of design and divine interven-
tion, a far cry from Darwin’s meaning of the term. Darwin
by and large retained the term adaptation, but in his book
on orchids (Darwin 1862) used the term contrivance to
refer specifically to structures that evolved by natural
selection. Likewise, Darwin debated whether to use an
historically more neutral term such as natural preservation,
rather than the term natural selection (see for instance,
Browne 2006), as this term, by analogy to artificial
selection, can imply the existence of a natural (or super-
natural) entity responsible for actively selecting individu-
als. In these two cases, the common and more semantically
charged terms prevailed. In contrast, Darwin strived to
distinguish the use in scientific contexts of the vernacular
terms development and evolution, distinguishing develop-
ment as those ontogenetic processes that occur during the
life of an individual and evolution as those processes that
occur between generations of individuals. Despite his and
subsequent efforts to distinguish the two terms within the
scientific community, confusion between them still persists
today within common parlance.
The issue of historical baggage associated with scientific
terms is not restricted to terms that were part of the ver-
nacular lexicon. Even terms newly coined within the sci-
entific context change their meaning, for science also has its
history. For example, Wilhelm Johannsen first used the term
gene in 1909, in reference to the smallest unit of hereditary.
(He also coined the terms phenotype and genotype.) The
word was thus coined prior to our knowledge that genes are
located in chromosomes, prior to our knowledge of the
molecular structure of DNA and of the existence of the
genetic code, and prior to our knowledge of the existence of
introns, exons, and regulatory regions. As our knowledge
expanded we have drifted far from the original idea of
particulate, physically well defined genes, and also from the
notion of a correspondence between a single gene variant
and a single protein. On the one hand, regulatory regions
(promoters and enhancers) are frequently not physically
adjacent to the protein encoding regions of the gene (the
exons). One the other hand, in eukaryotes, during
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transcription, different combinations of exons of a gene
may be transcribed and translated, giving rise to different
proteins (alternative splicing).1 However, many biologists
(and biology teachers) still refer to genes as if they were
closer to the original meaning of particulate hereditary
factors and we frequently encounter news referring to genes
as having a simple, direct effect on phenotypes.
Thus, as our knowledge of phenomena expands and the
meanings of terms evolve, so does our difficulty in pre-
cisely defining scientific terms. Furthermore, the scientific
community does not adjust synchronously to newer, more
complex meanings of scientific terms leading to discrep-
ancies in the use of the terms. As Hey (2001, p. 38) rec-
ognizes: ‘‘As we learn more about something, the more our
word for that something becomes ambiguous’’. Terms are
used with somewhat different meanings depending on the
context (e.g., the fitness of an allele vs. the fitness of an
individual). The recognition of increasing complexity of
phenomena and entities would perhaps warrant a broad-
ening of our scientific lexicon, each with more precise
definitions. New terms are indeed frequently coined, yet
they are not always incorporated into the common scien-
tific vocabulary (a topic certainly worth studying by his-
torians of science). Despite exceptions (e.g., the adoption
of several cladistics terms to distinguish among the evo-
lutionary information content of characters), there is a
tendency to use already familiar terms. Even when authors
are clear about what they mean by a given term, some
degree of confusion is generated among readers. This is
perhaps an indication that, in research papers, most scien-
tists are more focused on presenting results than on for-
mulating precise, formal definitions, or that frequently the
formulation of a precise definition is not a scientific
problem per se, i.e., it is not due, for instance, to lack of
scientific information.
We need not abandon our quest for better definitions of
terms, capable of being applied in different contexts and
encompassing a broad spectrum of phenomena and entities.
Different definitions for the same term may coexist in
different sub-fields of biology, which use different
approaches to similar phenomena. This may create some
confusion in the communication among these sub-fields,
and between the scientific community and the general
public. However, this can be surpassed if scientists are
clear about framing the perspective with which they are
using these terms. Eventual confusion created in such
cross-disciplinary discourse should not be avoided, but
engaged, as it is during such discussions that progress can
be achieved in clarifying the causes of misunderstanding
and in comprehending the broader complexity and richness
of a phenomena or entity.
Within biology, a divide among the meaning of terms
occurs frequently between those biologists studying pattern
versus process. Given the continuous nature of certain
biological phenomena (particularly evolutionary pro-
cesses), perhaps certain terms cannot be formally defined in
a precise way that satisfies both type of approaches. If the
lack of evident real boundaries results from the nature of
certain biological phenomena and entities, then our diffi-
culty in formulating widely usable definitions is not a
reflection of our inability to elaborate them or to agree
upon a single definition, but a predictable consequence of
the continuous character of our objects of study. This may
lead to an impasse, which I believe is the case regarding the
‘species definition problem’.
The concept of Species
One of the main areas of interest within the biological
sciences pertains to the diversity of life (at its many levels,
from biochemistry to organisms to ecosystems), and
includes our ability (and compulsion) to organize and
categorize diversity, and to understand the proximate and
ultimate causes of this diversity. The Systema Naturae of
Carolus Linnaeus, in the seventeenth century, with its
system of hierarchical taxonomic ranks and binominal
nomenclature for naming and organizing species (the basal
rank), remains the hallmark of most present-day taxonomy
and systematics. With the growth of our biological
knowledge about taxa and of evolutionary theory—stem-
ming largely from Darwin’s groundwork—progress was
made in our understanding of the causes of diversity and in
our methods of classifying and organizing taxa.
One fundamental contribution of evolutionary thought
was attributing importance to time and history. In this
framework, taxa are viewed as being related to one another
according to a branching model. For some time, the model
of a bifurcating evolutionary Tree of Life appeared quite
consistent with Linnaean hierarchical systematics, and thus
the initial integration of systematics within the Modern
Synthesis, in the 1930s–1940s, was fairly unproblematic.
In subsequent decades, however, exactly whether or how
systematics was to incorporate evolutionary thought turned
out to be a point of intense debate. Broadly speaking,
numeral taxonomists relied strictly on present patterns of
similarity, strict cladists based classifications on phyloge-
nies and required that taxa correspond to monophyletic
1 Exons are sections of a gene that are transcribed and translated into
a protein sequence. Introns are regions of DNA that occur interspaced
between exons and are not translated into protein. A gene can include
several interspaced exons. Some genes can potentially produce
different proteins when different combinations of exons are trans-
lated. The timing, location and pattern of exon transcription is
regulated via the activation and inhibition of additional DNA
sequences: the enhancers and promoters.
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groups (clades2), and evolutionary systematists combined
both similarity and evolutionary information. One more
recent, and radical proposal, the Phylocode (de Queiroz
2006), calls for an abandonment of Linnaean taxonomic
ranks altogether and the establishment of a systematics
based on monophyletic groups of taxa revealed by phylo-
genetic information.
As our knowledge of nature’s diversity has expanded,
particularly among microorganisms, and with the explosion
of molecular information and methods of phylogenetic
inference, systematics has faced new challenges and our
view of the Tree of Life has changed. For instance, our
acknowledgement of endosymbiogenesis has forced us to
recognize that during the evolution of life there have been
events of fusion of lineages (sometimes, widely divergent
lineages) and that therefore the Tree of Life is not a simple
bifurcating tree. Increasing recognition of horizontal gene
transfer among lineages (for instance, via hybridization,
introgression, bacterial exchange of plasmids, or viral
transfer of genes), as well as phenomena like lineage
sorting and recombination, have brought attention to dis-
crepancies between population or taxon trees (phylogenies)
and gene trees (genealogies). These advances have also
affected how we view species.
Ernst Mayr’s Biological Species Concept (BSE; Mayr
1942, 1982) emerged during the Modern Synthesis. It is
based on the existence of reproductive isolation between
populations. The BSE became the most widely referenced
and used species definition, despite several recognized
limitations, including the detection of isolation between
allopatric populations that seemingly belong to the same
species, the inapplicability to asexual species and fossils,
and the existence of hybridization and introgression
between apparently different species. Mayr’s original def-
inition of the BSE underwent minor modifications in
response to some of these problems. Its success is, to some
extent, due to the fact that it leads to a clear research
program on speciation, namely studying the evolution of
reproductive isolation (Coyne and Orr 2004). It is not,
however, a very operational definition, i.e., one easily used
by empirical systematists to identify species. Our advance
in knowledge, the limitations of the BSE and the interest in
incorporating evolutionary information within classifica-
tion, led to the formulation of additional definitions of
species that transcend the criteria of reproductive isolation
or phenetic similarity. Recent reviews consider as many
as 25 different definitions of species, many of which
suggested within the last few decades (Coyne and Orr
2004; Mayden 1997; Wilkins 2006).
Although the BSC has fostered research on the process
of speciation, its practical application, for many systema-
tists, involves the present state of populations and species,
i.e., their present pattern of reproductive isolation, as well
as their current morphological similarities, their present
ecology, distribution, etc. It is not fortuitous that several of
the new species definitions derive from the recent field of
molecular phylogenetics, which focuses rather on the
evolutionary process and the identification and description
of the history of evolutionary groups, or lineages.
Even systematists, concerned with identifying species,
that resort to molecular genealogies do so, primarily, in
order to identify the extent of present-day gene flow among
populations or, conversely, how genetically divergent are
present putative species. (Molecular systematists also use
genealogies to identify relationships among species and
higher order taxa in order to study higher level taxonomy,
but this does not pertain to the problem of the species
concept.) Naturally, ambiguities arise, given the continuous
nature of the process of speciation and evolution, for
instance, regarding how much genetic diversity is suffi-
cient, when combined with other characters (e.g., mor-
phological, biogeographical, ecological, etc.), to consider a
lineage a separate species.
To achieve their field’s objective, empirical systematists
need to recognize discrete units and divisions among them,
to identify and organize taxonomic groups, and to establish
a practical and informative classification. Ambiguities and
practical difficulties arise in this practice (e.g., ring spe-
cies,3 incipient species4), generally the more in detail one
studies a system: ‘‘The ambiguity does not arise because of
lack of understanding; rather, the reverse, the ambiguity is
revealed by a thorough understanding’’ (Hey 2001, p. 37).
Nonetheless, it is the job of systematists to decide how to
resolve such ambiguities, given the ultimate goal of iden-
tifying meaningful lower-level taxa. What is meaningful
may (and certainly does) vary among systematists. Some
2 A clade is a monophyletic group, i.e., a group consisting of a single
common ancestor and all its descendants. It is thus based on
evolutionary relationship and not strictly on similarity. It also implies
the inclusion of all the descendents of an ancestor. Thus, according to
cladists, Reptiles are not a monophyletic group as they to not include
all the descendents of their common ancestor, namely the Birds.
3 As a species expands its distribution, local populations adapt to
their local environment and diverge from one another, but retain the
ability to interbreed with adjacent populations. A «ring species» is
used to describe a species whose distribution has expanded such that
the most extreme, divergent populations secondarily contact one
another and are reproductively isolated, even though they can
exchange genes via the remaining intermediate populations. For
instance, Larus gulls have a cirum-polar distribution around the North
Pole. Most adjacent populations are able to hybridize, forming a chain
of interbreeding. However, the Herring Gull, from Great Britain, does
not hybridise with the Northwestern European Lesser Black-backed
Gulls.
4 As speciation is a continuous process, «incipient species» is a term
used to refer to populations that appear to be in an early stage of
speciation, revealing some degree of reproductive isolation and/or
phenotypic divergence, yet not having yet attained full isolation.
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are considered ‘‘lumpers’’ or ‘‘splitters’’ depending on their
tendency (or resistance) to establishing new species and
genera. In part this reflects a conflict between having
clearly defined taxa and a workable, useful classification
versus accepting the natural variation within taxa and
establishing a less tractable classification. Recently, tax-
onomists have also felt pressures to erect new taxa as
biological units in order to ensure their conservation.
Underlying this discussion is also a debate regarding the
ontological nature of species. Are they concrete categories,
natural kinds, with an ontological status—the realist posi-
tion regarding categories; are they categories, but abstract
mental constructs with no real correspondence in nature,
where the real entities are the category’s elements, the
individual organisms—the nominalist position among 18th
and 19th centuries wherein species were categories and
therefore not real (see Mayr 1982); or, are species real
(evolutionary) entities, not categories—the nominalist
position regarding categories, e.g., Ghiselin (1997)? Hey
(2001, p. 107) suggests this either/or dichotomy—species
as abstract categories versus real entities—as ‘‘misleading
and unnecessary.’’
Given recurrent patterns among organisms, humans
naturally construct mental categories. Ethnographic studies
reveal that different human populations naturally establish a
hierarchical classification of local species, wherein the most
basal level corresponds closely to species identified by sy-
stematists (Coyne and Orr 2004). That is, our mental cate-
gories corresponding to species, based on similarities whose
ultimate cause is their evolutionary relationship, tend to
correspond to real entities in nature, the evolutionary lin-
eages recognized by biologists. Do our mental categories
also correspond to real categories in nature? At least for
some taxa, this may indeed be true, as indicated by the
organisms themselves. They recognize, interact and repro-
duce with conspecifics in very different ways than with
individuals of other species. Regardless of the generality of
the reality of species as categories in nature (a topic which
would require further development), they do constitute
mental categories, which serve as the basis for taxonomy.
The organisms we include in such mental categories will
often not correspond, however, to evolutionary entities. But
they can, and should, be considered as hypotheses of evo-
lutionary lineages.
Naturally, evolutionary systematists do not simply
develop a classification based upon our mental categories.
They revise these categories based on additional informa-
tion, particularly evolutionary information, e.g., recogni-
tion of homologous and analogous characters. But this
process still results in discrete units, bound furthermore by
the use of a discrete language to describe them. Thus, a
lack of correspondence between species as categories (real
or not) and real evolutionary entities is not resolved by
species concepts focused on the genealogical process and
the identification of evolutionary groups. This latter per-
spective deals directly with processes through time, with
historical processes, with indistinct and interlaced entities.
The continuity and complexity of evolutionary phenomena
does not pose a practical quandary for those studying the
history of evolutionary groups. Indeed, it is a point of
interest. Thus, perhaps, we should restrict the application of
the discrete term species to approaches that deal with static
entities, amenable to delimitations, although this may at
times be difficult. This is not to say we should disregard
underlying information regarding the continuous processes
of speciation. Indeed, this is necessary to understand cases
where delimitation is unclear or reversible. This seems
preferable to applying an intrinsically discrete term to an
intrinsically continuous history, such as the history of
relationships between lineages, where delimitations and
ranks seem arbitrary.
The debate on the definition of species is due not to of
lack of information (Hey 2001), nor is it merely a scientific
problem (Brookfield 2002). I would suggest it arises rather
from a difference in perspective and object of focus. Sys-
tematics and phylogenetics, i.e., understanding and recov-
ering the evolutionary Tree of Life, have different
perspectives, somewhat different objectives, and perhaps
irreconcilable differences regarding our conception of
species. This need not constitute an epistemological prob-
lem, as long as one recognizes the difference between the
fields. It does, however, muddle the discussion if the
debaters do not realize and recognize their different per-
spectives on the same phenomena. We should perhaps
reconsider whether there is a species definition problem,
abandon the objective of agreeing upon a single over-
arching definition, and find terms and language applicable
and adequate for different perspectives (classification of
patterns vs. understanding the processes of diversity) and,
also, for different groups of taxa (for instance, for asexual
organisms). Systematists, by necessity, use different meth-
ods to differentiate categories. Different species concep-
tions may be a requirement, given the diversity of, for
instance, modes of reproduction. Ambiguities and difficul-
ties will arise and are, in fact, to be expected, given that the
proximal entities that serve as objects of categorization are
the result of a historical, continuous, ongoing process of
diversification.
Units of selection
I do not intend to review the extensive debate on the unit of
selection (e.g., Dawkins 1982; Gliddon and Gouyon 1989;
Hull 1988; Lewontin 1970; Shanahan 1997), simply to
make some observations, following the previous lines of
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thought. One consideration, which I think is noteworthy,
concerns the coinage of new terms as this debate has
progressed. This allowed a specification of the aspects
authors were focusing on and which they considered most
relevant regarding the debate. Dawkins (1976) introduced
the distinction between replicator and vehicle. His point
was that the organism is a mere vehicle for replicators, the
only entities to persist across generations. This, organisms
would be best thought as the means through which there is
selection among replicators.
The term interactor, a less passive term than vehicle,
was introduced by Hull (1988); and Lloyd (2000) intro-
duced additional terms to distinguish among levels: bene-
ficiaries and manifestors. Using these more specific terms
one can distinguish more precisely and clearly which
functional roles authors attribute to each hierarchical level
of organization and their relation to a key concept in this
debate: adaptation. The discussion about which level
selection acts upon is also a discussion about which unit
manifests and benefits from an adaptation, and at what
level does the adaptive interaction occur.
These distinct terms prove useful, for instance, in order
to distinguish among different models of group selection.
George William’s (1966) attack on group selection was
focused on criticizing the interpretation of Wynne-Edwards
(1962) and others when group selection was proposed as
the cause of adaptations ‘‘for the good of the species’’.
Using the above terminology, Wynne-Edwards viewed the
group as the interactor, manifestor and beneficiary of the
adaptation. More recent models of group selection, such as
Wilson’s (1983), consider the group as the interactor, but
not as the manifestor or beneficiary, i.e., selection occurs as
a result of group interaction, but the adaptive characters are
not properties of the groups (they are not the manifestors),
and groups benefit only indirectly as adaptive characters
are not selected for ‘‘the good of the group’’ (group
members are the direct and ultimate beneficiaries of
adaptive characters). Although Williams (1966) admitted
group selection under very stringent conditions, the models
developed by Wilson, together with the clarification about
what is meant by adaptation, has led to a broader accep-
tance of group selection as a valid perspective.
If one accepts a model of origin of life with a pre-cellular
stage, for instance, with selection among self-replicating
RNAs, with no distinction among genotype and phenotype,
‘‘genes’’ could be considered both replicators and interac-
tors. But the vast majority of known life forms are cellular,
thus genes are rarely interactors. Genes are recognized as
the quintessential unit of replication, despite the fact that, as
referred above, molecular biology has revealed that their
structure is more complex that the term unit may imply, i.e.,
it is not only the ‘‘organism [that] is so difficult to define
satisfactorily’’ (Dawkins 1982, p. 253). There are also
clearly cases where genes should be considered the bene-
ficiaries of selection, e.g., meiotic drive and spacer, or junk,
DNA which Dawkins (1982) refers to as outlaws, e.g.,
meiotic drive5 and its suppression in diopsid flies (Wilkin-
son et al. 1998). But are genes the only valid replicators?
Many individuals modify their environment, through pro-
cesses such as ‘‘niche construction’’, thus modifying the
process of natural selection that acts upon those individuals.
Dawkins (1982) would consider such aspects as compo-
nents of the extended phenotype, which transcend the more
cohesive organism. But such modifications of the environ-
ment can be transmitted across generations, via a process of
ecological inheritance (Odling-Smee et al. 2003). Addi-
tionally, when considering certain social species, e.g.,
humans, there is also cultural transmission. One need not
consider Dawkin’s (1976) model of memes, to recognize
that in these species there is cultural inheritance among
individuals, across and within generations, including among
individuals that are not genetically related. Therefore, a
comprehensive understanding of certain evolutionary pro-
cesses may require the simultaneous consideration of all
three forms of inheritance (or replication)—genetic, eco-
logical, and cultural—and the interactions among them
(Durham 1991; Odling-Smee et al. 2003).
Are genes the only benefactors of adaptation? In order to
address this question one must delve further into a parallel
discussion of another fundamental term within evolution-
ary biology: the meaning of adaptation. [A discussion
which has also led to additional, more specific and clari-
fying terms, such as exaptation, disaptation, maladaptation
and aptation6 (Gould and Vrba 1982; Lauder et al. 1993).]
Within the biological literature one encounters the term
adaptation with somewhat distinct meanings: (1) adapta-
tion as a process, which ultimately benefits the propagation
of the unit of selection through time; and (2) adaptation as
a condition, whereby a given character is an adaptation to a
certain function or an aspect of the environment. From a
historic, evolutionary perspective, i.e., adaptation as a
process, the replicator may warrant being categorized as
5 During regular meiosis of a diploid cell, each copy of the two
homologous chromosomes is present in half of the descendent haploid
cells (e.g., sperm). Under meiotic drive, this ratio is biased in favour
of one of the chromosomes.
6 The different terms allow one to distinguish different evolutionary
histories of a character and its relation to its present function. Thus,
adaptation is reserved for a character that evolved specifically for its
present function. A character which originally evolved for a function
distinct from its present function is considered an exaptation. For
instance, the bird wing originally evolved for thermal regulation and
only subsequently for flight. Gould suggested that when uncertain
about the original function of a character one should refer to it simply
as an aptation. Disaptation is a formerly adaptive character that has
lost its function. If it is presently dysfunctional or detrimental, it is
referred to as a maladaptation.
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the ultimate benefactor of an adaptation. Yet, from the
perspective of adaptation as a condition, regarding a
character, this is clearly an unsatisfactory explanation.
Certainly, organisms benefit from the manifestation of an
adaptive character, and transmit this character (via some
form of inheritance) to their descendents. We return,
therefore, to the importance of perspective of an author’s
approach to a problem.
Dawkins (1982) considers the gene perspective more
useful and comprehensive: ‘‘adaptations as being ‘for the
benefit’ of something, that something is best not seen as the
individual organism [but the] smaller unit which I call the
active, germ-line replicator’’ (p. 4); or, ‘‘Adaptations ben-
efit the genetic replicators responsible for them, and only
incidentally the individual organism involved’’ (p. 249).
However, in the beginning of ‘‘The Extended Phenotype’’
he uses the image of a Necker Cube to illustrate how
selection at the level of the gene and of the organism are
equally valid descriptions of the same phenomena, simply
from different perspectives (Fig. 1). A gene-centered per-
spective and an organism-centered perspective (with its
phenotypic extensions) are simply ‘‘different way[s] of
saying the same thing. (…) Readers must decide for
themselves’’ (p. 232).
Contrary to the context of species, explored in the pre-
vious section, in this debate differences in perspective are
not due to differences between the objectives of different
fields of biology, although some partition may be found
between geneticists and organismal biologists. The division
is perhaps more philosophical than scientific, in particular,
whether a scientist has a more reductionist, determinist
versus a more integrative, interactionist thinking.
We also re-encounter, in this debate, problems of
delimitation. Firstly, regarding the delimitation of the unit
of selection, there are ambiguities at several hierarchical
levels: gene and organism/phenotype (as well as at higher
levels not considered here, such as group/population
and species/clade). Second, regarding the benefactor of
selection, the different perspectives place the focus on
different parts of a continuous process: the life cycle.
Two attempts have been suggested as alternatives to
considering a single valid perspective. Gould (2002, p.
677), for instance, considers a system of hierarchical levels
of causality. Sterenly and Kitcher (1988) proposed a view
they refer to as pluralism, i.e., no single adequate repre-
sentation, but several equally adequate representations for
some processes, each perspective offering a partial repre-
sentation of the causal structure of the selection process.
They further suggest, however, that by considering the
interactions and causal connections among different levels,
one would obtain a single maximally adequate represen-
tation of the phenomena, which if considered at face value
is a far cry from a pluralist view (Shanahan 2009). A dif-
ferent approach, derived from a developmental viewpoint,
has been suggested that regards developmental systems as
the units of selection, i.e., the complete life cycle, including
its various components and causal contributors (the geno-
type, phenotype, and the environment) (Oyama et al.
2001). This holistic approach, however, entails problems of
tractability and also delimitation: where does a life cycle
begin and end? And, if considering an extended phenotype
involving biotic interactions, should we consider the whole
intervening biological system, with different symbiotic
species, as the proper unit of selection? Thus once again
the complex and continuous character of natural entities
and processes derails our thirst for clear, clean cut
explanations.
Final comment
My purpose was not to reach a conclusion regarding the
‘species concept problem’ or the debate on ‘units of
selection’, simply to use these two cases to illustrate how
certain debates over fundamental concepts can be con-
founded by differences in perspective of the same phe-
nomena, by use of similar words used with different
meanings and a lack of sufficiently precise terms, or by
differences in the objectives of different fields. Ultimately,
biologists face the difficulty of leading with complex sys-
tems, with multiple interacting factors, and continuous
processes, all of which create a demand for further analysis
and discussion, both scientific and philosophical. A dis-
cussion that should avoid rigid bi-polarizations and con-
sider forms of integrating different perspectives.
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Fig. 1 Reversible figures which can be perceived as different images
depending on the viewer’s perspective. In the Necker Cube (left) one
sees either a downward or upward tilted cube. In the right-hand
image, one sees either a vase or two people facing one another
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